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Executive Summary 
For this report, the Northwest Economic Research Center (NERC) investigated six potential revenue 
generating measures, as requested by Portland Parks and Recreation (PP&R). This research includes an 
analysis of the revenue potential for each tax, the impacts of compression in property taxes, and an 
assessment of tax incidence.  
Three of the funding options investigated are forms of property tax: a temporary local option tax, a 
permanent special district tax, and a general bond obligation. Using 2017 property tax data, NERC built a 
model that simulates these tax increases for each tax lot in Portland. The growth of Assessed Value (AV) 
and Real Market Value (RMV) over time are accounted for in revenue projections, which are made from 
FY2020-21 to FY2024-25. PP&R provided the scenarios that determined the target value to raise 
independently from any NERC analysis. The rates described in the report are the rates necessary to meet 
these targets.  
Our model estimates a $0.92 (per $1,000 AV) temporary local option property tax would generate roughly 
$50 million for PP&R in FY 2020-21. This equates to a $76.60 increase (per $100,000 AV) for a typical 
household. By gradually increasing the rate to $1.19 over a five-year horizon, these revenues can reach 
up to $68 million by FY 2024-25. For comparison, this would change the average household tax bill 
increase from $76.60 to $92.10 (per $100,000 AV).  
In order to raise the same $50 million, the city would need to levy a permanent special district tax of $0.80 
(per $1,000 AV). This fee would increase the typical Portland household tax bill by $67.80 (per $100,000 
AV) – about $9 less than the local option. However, adding a special district tax affects the funding of 
other local tax levies more than adding a local option tax, due to tax compression (a term that describes 
the mandatory limit on property tax rates in Oregon, as set forth in 1990’s Ballot Measure 5). Compression 
“squeezes” revenues from both local option and special district taxes, reducing them below expected 
levels calculated using solely tax rates and property values. 
The final property tax revenue option examined is a general obligation bond. This type of property tax 
does not have compression effects, but does entail the restriction that revenues can only be used for 
capital purchases (i.e. cannot be put toward operating costs). Because of this caveat, we estimate a bond 
rate of $0.74 (per $1,000 AV) is required to raise a slightly lower target of $48 million in revenue. Adding 
this bond is estimated to increase a typical Portland household’s property tax by $74.30 (per $100,000 
AV).  
The other three funding options analyzed are consumer goods taxes: a transient lodging tax, a cell phone 
tax, and a prepared food and beverage tax. All three taxes are estimated for 2018. 
Portland currently has three local transient lodging taxes; two levied at the city level and one collected by 
Multnomah County (and passed through to Metro). These taxes are paid by travelers renting short-term 
lodging (hotels, Airbnb, private campsites, etc.) and collected by the operator of the accommodation. 
Considered simultaneously, these taxes result in a 15.3% rate on lodging in Portland, comparable to that 
observed in cities across the Pacific Northwest. The City of Portland estimates that raising this tax by 1% 
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would have generated an additional $7 million in 2018.1 However, this new revenue is limited in what it 
may be used for – Oregon statutes mandate that no more than 30% of local transient lodging taxes can 
be set aside for city or county services.2 
With the implementation of a 5% cell phone tax on the wireless industry, our analysis estimates annual 
revenues for 2018 between $6.98 and $7.25 million. We arrive at these estimates with three different 
methodologies. The first approach uses wireless gross receipts data for the nation as a whole from the 
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), proportionately adjusted to match Portland 
population levels. The next two methods use data from the City of Portland’s 2017 Tax on Wireless 
Communication Services. We use 2016 estimates for wireless revenues in both Multnomah County and 
the city of Eugene and then scale these values by national wireless revenue growth rates to arrive at 2018 
revenue estimates for both areas.  
Lastly, our estimates find that a 5% food and beverage tax in Portland could have generated between 
$72.9 and $96.1 million in revenue in 2018. The low estimate is derived using 2018 gross national 
restaurant sales from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW) survey, scaled to Portland levels, with a 5% rate applied. If the restaurant business is more 
intensive in Portland than the U.S. as a whole, this may lead to an underestimate. Higher estimates are 
calculated using revenues from Ashland’s Food and Beverage Tax and the Portland Business License Tax 
for businesses associated with food and beverage sales.  
What follows in this report is a detailed account of how these estimated are obtained, what the funding 
potential is for each option, how the phenomenon of compression will alter revenues for property taxes, 
and how the tax burden will be distributed in the local economy for each of the revenue generating 
measures described above.   
Property Taxes 
Data and Methodology 
Three property tax funding options are considered: i) a temporary local option tax; ii) a permanent special 
district tax; and iii) a general bond obligation. We use 2017 property tax data, which includes Maximum 
Assessed Value (MAV) and Real Market Value (RMV) at property level. MAV and RMV are adjusted to 
account for their potential change over time. Their assumed growth rates over the period of five years 
(Table 1) are consistent with the ones used in revenue projections by other levies3. Our model also 
requires the current tax rates of all local options and permanent special districts-- these are provided by 
Multnomah County, and used in all property tax estimates for this report. 
Table 1: Assumptions used in property tax simulation 
Assumptions FY 2017-18 FY 2018-19 FY 2019-20 FY 2020-21 FY 2021-22 FY 2022-23 FY 2023-24 FY 2024-25 
RMV Growth 13.8% 7.5% 5.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
AV Growth 4.8% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.0% 
                                                          
1 Estimates provided by City Economist Josh Harwood 
2 OregonLegislature.gov. (2019). 2017 ORS 320.350. Retrieved from 
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors320.html 
3 As provided by City Economist Josh Harwood.  
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The calculation is straightforward in the case of the general obligation bond: the tax rate is determined 
simply by dividing the target revenue ($50 million) by total MAV for each property. However, this method 
cannot be transferred when considering local option and permanent special district taxes because of past 
ballot measures limiting property taxes and resulting in the phenomenon of property tax compression.  
Compression is an important characteristic of Oregon’s property tax system. Oregon Ballot Measure 5, 
passed in November of 1990, requires that, for every property, total property taxes dedicated to general 
government are limited to $10 for every $1,000 RMV. When that limit is exceeded, the total tax rate must 
remain the same, so taxes are reduced in a specified order (described below), meaning that an increase 
in one tax levy results in decreased revenue for other tax levies. This decrease in revenue is termed 
compression, and it occurs at the property level. Temporary local options and permanent special district 
taxes are subject to the compression, while general bond obligations are exempt from it, meaning that 
they are not included in the tax required to fall under the 10% limit (hence the simplicity of the 
calculation). According to the priority of taxes in compression, local option taxes are compressed first, and 
if there are multiple local options, all of them are compressed proportionately. The compression of 
permanent special district taxes starts only after all local option taxes are zero, and if there are multiple 
special district taxes, proportionate compression is also applied. 
This tax compression has a number of implications. First, an increase in the special district or local option 
tax rate (or both) does not necessarily coincide with a proportional rise in government revenue. Actual 
revenue generated is generally lower than total tax extended. Second, since the compression occurs at an 
individual property level, using aggregate data is likely to produce an inaccurate estimate of the tax rate 
required to meet a target revenue. Third, due to the proportionate compression mechanism, raising 
revenue through a specific PP&R levy will necessarily result in lower revenues for other existing tax levies. 
Due to the compression order, which levy has a reduction and by how much, depends on the type of tax 
(i.e. whether it is a permanent rate or a temporary local option) adopted by PP&R in relation to other 
existing property tax levies in place.  
More specifically, a PP&R local option will result in a decrease in local option revenues collected by the 
other levies, but will not affect their permanent special district taxes, while a PP&R permanent special 
district tax will reduce all of them. Consequently, to reach a given revenue goal, the local option requires 
a higher tax rate, but impacts the revenue of other levies less. The permanent special district draws more 
revenue from other levies, thereby requiring a lower tax rate. To this end, it is clear that using the local 
option to fund the PP&R will cause, on average, a larger increase in household tax bills than using the 
permanent special district. The bond obligation is not compressed and does not affect the revenue of 
other levies; and its effect on household tax bills depends on the scenario and state of compression of the 
household.  
The Fire & Police Disability & Retirement Fund (FPDR) adds an additional dimension of complexity. FPDR 
has a target revenue, which is raised by a permanent special district tax. Although the tax is subject to 
compression, the levy can increase its tax rate until the target is met. The target revenue of FPDR over the 
next five years is provided in Table 2.4 Due to compression, adding the PP&R permanent tax necessarily 
                                                          
4 For the simulation, we use the required FPDR revenue without accounting for discounts or delinquencies. As a 
result, our estimated FPDR rates without PP&R is marginally lower than those of the FPDR department. 
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causes the FPDR revenue to be reduced. Therefore, for each fiscal year, a new FPDR rate must be 
estimated so that both departments can simultaneously achieve their target revenues. This issue does not 
arise in cases of the PP&R local option due to the order of compression, or for the general bond obligation, 
which is exempt from compression.  
Table 2: Target FPDR Revenue 
Assumptions FY 2020-21 FY 2021-22 FY 2022-23 FY 2023-24 FY 2024-25 
FPDR Target Revenue 
($ million) 
163.5 182.8 195.0 210.1 224.1 
 
Given all of the complications analyzed above, the simulation strategy for the case of the PP&R local 
option differs slightly from the case of the PP&R permanent special district. 
To determine the PP&R local option rate, we follow a simple algorithm. For each property, we first 
calculate the tax limit equal to 1% of its RMV, and select an initial rate. Then we calculate the total 
property tax extended on that lot, and compare it to the tax limit. If the extended tax does not exceed the 
limit, then the levied PP&R tax revenue is equal to the amount extended. If the extended tax is higher 
than the limit, however, compression is modeled for as follows.  
First, we compare the permanent special district tax revenue to the limit. If the former is less than the 
latter, the total local option revenue will be equal to their difference. If the former is larger than or equal 
to the latter, the local option revenue is set to zero, and the permanent special district tax revenue is set 
equal to the limit. After accounting for compression, the PP&R revenue can be calculated by multiplying 
the PP&R local option rate with the after-compression total local option revenue, and then divided by the 
total local option rate. The total PP&R revenue is the sum of revenues across all properties. This total 
revenue is then compared to the target revenue. A lower rate is applied if it exceeds the target, and a 
higher rate is applied if it is lower than the target, until the two are sufficiently close to each other. 
For the permanent special district tax, the compression process is similar, but not identical. Because the 
imposition of the PP&R permanent special district affects the FPDR revenue due to compression, some 
modifications to the revenue calculation are warranted. First, based on the target revenues provided by 
FPDR, we recover the FPDR tax rate and revenue at property level before the PP&R permanent rate is 
introduced, using a procedure similar to the calculation of the PP&R local option rate. Then, we subtract 
the original FPDR rate from the total permanent special district rate to obtain the total rate of all fixed 
components. Finally, we estimate a permanent special district rate sufficient to raise revenue equal to the 
total target revenue of PP&R and FPDR. The estimation procedure is similar to the one used to calculate 
the FPDR rate, with the only exception being that the total permanent rate now equals the total rate of 
all fixed components (i.e. excluding the original FPDR) plus the total rate of PP&R and FPDR so that FPDR 
is not double-counted. The PP&R individual rate can be calculated by multiplying the obtained rate by 
PP&R’s share of the PP&R and FPDR total revenue. 
The compression loss amounts to the difference between the total tax extended and the total tax levied. 
To calculate the revenue losses of other departments, we compare their revenues before and after the 
PP&R tax is added, holding the target FPDR revenue unchanged. The revenue of each local option tax is 
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calculated by multiplying its tax rate by the total local option tax levied, and then dividing by the total rate 
of all local option taxes. A similar process is also used to calculate the permanent special district revenue. 
PP&R requested NERC calculate the rates under two different scenarios (called Scenarios 2 and 3 since 
the first scenario—not modeled—involves no change in revenue, and thus no change in tax). These 
scenarios have increasing revenue goals over a five-year period, with Scenario 2 incorporating little to no 
expansion of PP&R’s activities, and Scenario 3 incorporating some capital and operating expansion. 
NERC’s estimates of rates, compression impacts, etc. are presented with regards to these scenarios. 
Notably, the goals for the bond is lower because the bond cannot be used to fund operating cost. Finally, 
the difference between “goal” and “generated” is about 0.1% or less; essentially 
measurement/approximation error. 
Revenue Impacts 
Table 3 presents the estimated mill rates required for a local option tax to reach the target revenues over 
the period of five years. For example, a $0. 92 (per $1,000 AV) temporary local option property tax would 
generate roughly $50 million in FY 2020-21. By gradually increasing the rate to $1.19 over a five-year 
horizon, these revenues can reach up to $68 million by FY 2024-25. In order to raise the same $50 million, 
the city would need to levy a smaller special district tax of $0.80 (per $1,000 AV), as shown in Table 4, 
which provides revenues and necessary mill rates for the special district tax scenario.  
The final property tax revenue option examined is a general obligation bond (Table 5). This type of 
property tax does not have compression effects; however, these funds can only be used for capital 
purchases (i.e. cannot be put toward operating costs). Because of this caveat, we estimate a bond rate of 
$0.74 (per $1000 AV) is required to raise a slightly lower target of $48 million in revenue. 
PP&R requested NERC calculate the rates under two different scenarios (called Scenarios 2 and 3 since 
the first scenario—not modeled—involves no change in revenue, and thus no change in tax). These 
scenarios have increasing revenue goals over a five-year period, with Scenario 2 incorporating little to 
no expansion of PP&R’s activities, and Scenario 3 incorporating some capital and operating expansion. 
NERC’s estimates of rates, compression impacts, etc. are presented with regards to these scenarios. 
Notably, the goals for the bond is lower because the bond cannot be used to fund operating cost. Finally, 
the difference between “goal” and “generated” is about 0.1% or less, and just sort of 
measure/approximation error5. 
  
                                                          
5 Estimates reported are rounded 
PORTLAND PARKS AND RECREATION: FUNDING AND FINANCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS  7 
 
   
 Northwest Economic  
 Research Center   
 





($ per $1,000 MAV) 
Scenario 2     
FY 2020-21 50.1 0.923 
FY 2021-22 54.5 0.979 
FY 2022-23 58.3 1.015 
FY 2023-24 63.0 1.064 
FY 2024-25 68.3 1.118 
Scenario 3     
FY 2019-20 119.3 2.375 
FY 2020-21 126.2 2.440 
FY 2021-22 132.6 2.474 
FY 2022-23 140.0 2.517 









($ per $1,000 MAV) 
Scenario 2     
FY 2020-21 50.1 0.798 
FY 2021-22 54.5 0.841 
FY 2022-23 58.3 0.873 
FY 2023-24 63.0 0.914 
FY 2024-25 68.3 0.962 
Scenario 3     
FY 2020-21 119.3 1.922 
FY 2021-22 126.2 1.971 
FY 2022-23 132.6 2.008 
FY 2023-24 140.0 2.055 
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($ per $1,000 MAV) 
Scenario 2     
FY 2020-21 47.9 0.743 
FY 2021-22 49.8 0.747 
FY 2022-23 51.7 0.753 
FY 2023-24 53.7 0.758 
FY 2024-25 55.8 0.764 
Scenario 3     
FY 2020-21 73.5 1.140 
FY 2021-22 76.3 1.145 
FY 2022-23 79.2 1.152 
FY 2023-24 82.1 1.158 
FY 2024-25 85.2 1.166 
 
Compression Impacts 
The property tax revenues cannot be stated without also discussing their impact on compression. In order 
to remain below the state mandated threshold for property taxes, an increase in local option or 
permanent special district property tax earmarked for PP&R would result in decreased revenue for other 
city services. Due to the compression priority, the latter affects all of them while the former affects only 
those that are funded by local option property taxes. As shown in Table 6, the difference in terms of 
revenue loss to other agencies caused by the PP&R local option and the PP&R special district can be 
substantial, approaching a factor of nine. The fact that FPDR revenue must be fixed further magnifies the 
impact of the PP&R special district on other property taxes. As the bond obligation is exempt from the 
compression, it has no effect on other agencies. Table 7 describes the reduction in revenue by levy under 
both a local option and a permanent levy in the first year (FY 2020-21) compared to the FY 2019-20 
revenue. 
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Table 6: Reduction in revenue to other existing levies ($ million) 
Year   PP&R target revenue Local Option Special District 
Scenario 2         
FY 2020-21 Year 1 50.1 -0.72 -6.38 
FY 2021-22 Year 2 54.5 -0.79 -7.09 
FY 2022-23 Year 3 58.3 -0.84 -7.52 
FY 2023-24 Year 4 63.0 -0.90 -8.12 
FY 2024-25 Year 5 68.3 -0.96 -8.68 
Scenario 3         
FY 2020-21 Year 1 119.3 -1.87 -17.13 
FY 2021-22 Year 2 126.2 -2.01 -18.52 
FY 2022-23 Year 3 132.6 -2.09 -19.30 
FY 2023-24 Year 4 140.0 -2.20 -20.34 
FY 2024-25 Year 5 148.2 -2.29 -21.25 
 
 







Metro City of 
Portland 
Port  Metro East/west 
soil 
County  Urban 
Renewal 
Districts 
Local                   
Scenario 2 -2.4% -1.9% -1.9% - - - - - - 
Scenario 3 -6.2% -4.9% -5.0% - - - - - - 
Permanent                 
Scenario 2 -4.2% -3.3% -3.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% -0.6% -0.7% 
Scenario 3 -10.8% -8.5% -8.7% -1.2% -1.3% -1.4% -1.6% -1.7% -1.8% 
 
Tax Incidence Analysis 
Table 8 compares the effect of using the local option and the special district property tax on taxpayers. As 
explained, since the local option tends to pull less revenue from other departments, a given target 
revenue requires a higher mill rate, resulting in a larger increase to the homeowner’s tax bill on average 
than the special district. For example, to raise $50 million by the PP&R local option, a typical homeowner 
would have to pay an additional tax of $76.6 for every $100,000 of their house’s assessed value while the 
owners of median value houses would have to pay $144.2 more. In the special district case, these figures 
are only $67.8 and $127.7, respectively. For the bond obligation with slightly less revenue (i.e. $48 million), 
they are $74.3 and $139.9, respectively (Table 9). As expected, the effect of the bond obligation should 
be higher than that of the permanent special district case due to its compression exemption, but less than 
that of the local option due to its lower revenue target. 
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Scenario 2             
FY 2020-21 50.1 188.3 76.6 144.2 67.8 127.7 
FY 2021-22 54.5 194.6 80.6 156.9 71.1 138.4 
FY 2022-23 58.3 200.8 83.7 168.0 73.9 148.4 
FY 2023-24 63.0 207.2 87.6 181.4 77.4 160.3 
FY 2024-25 68.3 213.4 92.1 196.7 81.6 174.2 
Scenario 3             
FY 2020-21 119.3 188.3 182.1 343.0 158.4 298.3 
FY 2021-22 126.2 194.6 186.4 362.7 161.6 314.4 
FY 2022-23 132.6 200.8 189.9 381.2 164.9 331.2 
FY 2023-24 140.0 207.2 194.2 402.4 168.7 349.5 
FY 2024-25 148.2 213.4 199.7 426.2 173.8 370.9 
 









($ Per $100,000 
AV) 
Tax Bill Increase 
by Median AV 
($) 
Scenario 2         
FY 2020-21 47.9 188.3 74.3 139.9 
FY 2021-22 49.8 194.6 74.7 145.4 
FY 2022-23 51.7 200.8 75.3 151.1 
FY 2023-24 53.7 207.2 75.8 157.0 
FY 2024-25 55.8 213.4 76.4 163.0 
Scenario 3         
FY 2020-21 73.5 188.3 114.0 214.6 
FY 2021-22 76.3 194.6 114.5 222.8 
FY 2022-23 79.2 200.8 115.2 231.3 
FY 2023-24 82.1 207.2 115.8 239.9 
FY 2024-25 85.2 213.4 116.6 248.8 
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While they differ in their impact on taxpayers, all three measures are regressive: the local option and 
permanent special districts are equally regressive, and bonds are the least regressive on average (it should 
be emphasized that this finding is true on average, and that there are exceptions to this rule). Figures 3 
and 4 illustrate the percent increase in taxes faced at different income levels, for the local option 
tax/special district tax and bond obligation respectively. (Again, the local option tax and special district 
tax have the same distribution in terms of percent increase by income level, hence the representation on 
the same graph.)  
Figure 3, on the next page, shows the spatial distribution by median income (top) and by estimated tax 
bill (bottom). These maps suggest that, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, the wealthiest households do not 
face the highest tax bills, and present this information geographically. The regressivity can be attributed 
in part to compression, which caps the tax payments for some homes in wealthier areas. 
 
Figure 1: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income level (for select areas) by Local Option 
or Permanent Levy 
  
Note: The results are for the case of imposing a $1.00 mill rate of local option. Use of a $1.00 permanent 
special district would produce virtually the same result. 







$0 $20,000 $40,000 $60,000 $80,000 $100,000 $120,000 $140,000 $160,000 $180,000
$1.00 Local Option
Census Tract with Median 
Household Income of 160k, 
would see (on average) a 2% 
increase in their tax bill 
Census Tract with Median 
Household Income of 20k, 
would see (on average) a 
3.8% increase in their tax bill 
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Figure 2: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income (for select areas) by bond obligation 
Note: The results are for the case of imposing a $1.00 mill rate of bond obligation 
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Figure 3: Percent increase in taxes paid by median household income levels by bond obligation 
Spatial Distribution of households by their median households incomes 
 
Spatial Distribution of households by Tax Bill 
 
Source: Randy Morris, Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies 
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New Cell Phone Tax 
Data and Methodology 
In 1997, the City of Eugene adopted an ordinance requiring telecommunications companies to pay a 2% 
business tax in order to fund future telecommunication-related projects.6 The tax is passed to consumers 
on their monthly cell phone bill, and generated roughly $800,000 for the city in 2016. We consider a similar 
tax for the City of Portland, which currently administers a negotiated fee on telecommunication services 
but does not have an outright cell phone tax.  
We arrive at these estimates using three different methodologies; the first employs national level data 
from the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) 2019 Industry Survey. These wireless 
gross receipts are then proportionately adjusted to match Portland population levels. After arriving at an 
estimated value for total wireless revenue for Portland, we reduce the taxable revenue by 15%7 due to 
devices and services that are not subject to the tax but are included in industry data. After applying the 
5% tax rate, we then adjust the revenues further to account for internet access charges, which are non-
taxable.  
The next two methods use data from the City of Portland’s 2017 Tax on Wireless Communication Services. 
We use this report’s 2016 estimates for wireless revenues in both Multnomah County and the City of 
Eugene, and then scale these values by national wireless revenue growth rates to arrive at 2018 revenue 
estimates for both areas. Once we have estimated total revenue, the methodologies for Multnomah 
County and Eugene diverge: the county level uses a similar process to that described above with the 
national CTIA data, but Eugene’s results are estimated using a “bottom-up” approach. First, 2018 
estimates for revenue per capita are calculated, subsequently converted to Portland revenue per capita 
using a multiplier, and finally aggregated to estimate wireless tax revenues for the city.  
Revenue Impacts 
With the implementation of a 5% tax, our analysis estimates annual wireless revenues for 2018 between 
$6.98 and $7.25 million. Table 10 delineates these findings. Since cell phone rates do not depend on 
income, cell phone taxes are regressive.   
Table 10: 2018 Revenue Estimates from Portland Cell Phone Tax 
Method 2018 Revenue 
Extrapolated from CTIA National Data $6,982,414 
Extrapolated from Eugene Tax Revenue* $7,138,334 
Extrapolated from Multnomah County's Tax Revenue Collected* $7,254,479 
*Revenue extrapolated from 2018 national revenue growth 
 
                                                          
6 Eugene-or.gov (2004) City of Eugene Fact Sheet Fees and Taxes on Telecommunications Businesses. Retrieved 
from https://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2065/TelecomFeeFactSheet?bidId= 
7 The 15% reduction of taxable revenues is taken from City of Portland’s 2017 Wireless Tax Analysis 
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New Prepared Food and Beverage Tax  
Data and Methodology 
Another tax option analyzed is the prepared Food and Beverage Tax (FBT). Ashland, Oregon has had a 5% 
FBT since 1993, projected to bring in nearly $3 million in revenue for the city in 2019. The Ashland FBT is 
levied on all prepared food items served in a restaurant, excluding alcohol – this includes takeout, delivery 
orders, grocery store deli items, coffee shops, caterers, and food carts.  
We employ three methods to estimate the revenue potential for a Portland FBT. The first estimate is 
derived using 2018 gross national restaurant sales, scaled to Portland levels with the 5% tax applied. It is 
reasonable to assume this estimate represents a lower bound for the area, due to the city’s prevalent 
“foodie” culture of fine dining. Higher estimates are calculated using revenues from Ashland’s Food and 
Beverage Tax and the Portland Business License Tax for businesses associated with food and beverage 
sales. 
Beginning with Ashland’s FBT revenue estimates from the city’s 2017-19 Biennium Budget, we use a 
simple population adjustment to translate these figures to Portland. In 2018 Ashland’s population was 
roughly 20,700, representing 3.29% of the population in Portland (630,300). Scaling the Ashland revenues 
up by this percentage, we estimate a similar FBT tax would generate roughly $90 million in revenue for 
the city of Portland.  
Lastly, we extrapolate Portland business revenues for businesses with NAICS codes associated with the 
prepared food and beverage industry. With data from the Portland Revenue Bureau’s food and beverage 
sales tax analysis, we adjust 2012 gross income for the industry using wage growth as a proxy. First, we 
calculate wage growth between 2012 and 2018 using Food Service and Drinking Places data from Oregon 
Employment Department. Once this growth is applied, we arrive at an estimated $1.92 billion in gross 
income for Portland food and beverage industries. Finally, the 5% tax is applied to the industry’s aggregate 
income, resulting in an estimated $96 million in government revenue. 
Revenue Impacts 
Our estimates, displayed in Table 11, find that a 5% FBT in Portland could have generated between $72.9 
and $96.1 million in revenue in 2018. We note the higher estimates are likely closer to the true value since 
there is a prevalent dining culture in Portland.  
Table 11: 2018 Revenue Estimates from Portland Food and Beverage Tax 
Method 2018 Revenue 
Extrapolated from National Restaurant Association Data $72,949,528 
Extrapolated from Ashland's Tax Revenue Collected $90,276,074 
Extrapolated from Portland Business Revenue* $96,118,835 
*Portland Business Revenue extrapolated from 2012 using wage growth as a proxy 
To gain some insight on how stable this revenue source could be, it’s helpful to examine the volatility of 
Ashland’s FBT from 2008 to 2019. As shown in Figure 4, FBT revenues for the city have increased every 
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year except 2009-2010 (this is unsurprising due to the Great Recession); however growth tends to 
bounce from zero to positive values ranging between 10%-20%.  
Figure 4: Ashland, OR Food and Beverage Tax (FBT), Annual Revenue, 2008-2019 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the percent of food eaten away versus at home broken down into income quintiles at 
the national level. The data indicates that prepared food and beverages are a special type of good known 
as a luxury good; this means that higher income individuals spend more of their income on these goods 
than do their lower income counterparts. Unlike a normal good, when a flat tax is applied to a luxury good, 
that tax is considered progressive. It is easy to see how this would be the case of a prototypical luxury 
good such as a yacht or private airplane, but prepared food and beverages fall into the rather nebulous 
zone between a normal and luxury good, since the difference in share of consumption between lower and 
high-income individuals is small. Due to this nebulousness, NERC refers to a food and beverage tax as 
“relatively progressive,” since it is more progressive than most of the other taxes discussed in the report.  
Figure 5: Average Share of Total Real Consumption by Income Quintile (1984-2012)8
 
                                                          
8 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 1984-2012. Cleveland Federal Reserve. 
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Increase in Transient Lodging Tax 
Revenue Impacts 
Portland currently has three local transient lodging taxes; two levied at the city level and one collected by 
Multnomah County (and passed through to Metro). These taxes are paid by travelers renting short-term 
lodging (hotels, Airbnb, private campsites…etc.) and collected by the operator of the accommodation. 
Combining these taxes, the rate in Portland is currently 15.3% which is similar to other lodging taxes in 
cities across the Pacific Northwest. The City of Portland estimates that raising this tax 1% would generate 
an additional $7 million.9 However, this new revenue is limited in what it may be used for – Oregon 
statutes mandate that no more than 30% of local transient lodging taxes can be set aside for city or county 
services.10 Other lodging (a Bureau of Labor Statistics category which includes hotels) is a luxury good 
because spending as a proportion of income increases with income (see Figure 2). 
Table 12: Estimated Revenue from 1% Increase in Lodging Tax 
Method 2018 Revenue 
City of Portland estimate for 1% increase $7,000,000 
 
Conclusion 
This report explored six different tax options (or tax increases) for the purposes of increasing revenue for 
Portland Parks and Recreation. Three of these options fall under the umbrella of property taxes and three 
are goods taxes. Due to state limits on property taxes such tax increases warrant in-depth discussions 
regarding the effects of compression which are provided above.  
Of the three property tax options, a permanent special district tax is the least expensive for the typical 
homeowner, however this option has the largest implications in terms of revenue loss for other local 
levies. Temporary local option property taxes place a higher burden on taxpayers, with smaller 
compression adjustments, while general obligation bonds cost taxpayers more still given the absence of 
compression effects for this type of taxation.  
Other than the prepared Food and Beverage Tax, the non-property tax revenue options have much lower 
funding potential - both a 1% increase in transient lodging taxes as well as a 5% cell phone tax could raise 
the city approximately $7 million. The revenue potential for FBT far outweigh the former options, with 
the potential to bring in between $73-$96 million annually. While this option remains somewhat volatile, 




                                                          
9 Estimates provided by City Economist Josh Harwood 
10 OregonLegislature.gov. (2019). 2017 ORS 320.350. Retrieved from 
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors320.html 
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Temporary Local Option Property 
Tax  
$0.923 (per $1000 AV) $50 Million Regressive 
Permanent Special District Tax $0.798 (per $1000 AV) $50 Million Regressive 
General Obligation Bond $0.743 (per $1000 AV) $48 Million 
Regressive 




Food and Beverage Tax 
5% on individual prepared 





Transient Lodging Tax 1% increase ~$7 Million 
Relatively 
Progressive 
Cell Phone Tax 
5% on eligible cell phone 













Appendix: General Property Tax Increases 
Table 14: General Increase in Temporary Local Option Property Tax Levy in FY 2020/21 
Revenue Raised 
($ million) 
Reduction in revenue 
to other agencies 
($ million) 
Tax Bill Increase 
($ Per $100,000 AV) 
Median Single Family 
Property Tax Bill 
Increase 
($) 
5.5 -0.07 8.5 15 
11.1 -0.15 16.9 31 
16.5 -0.23 25.3 46 
22.0 -0.31 33.7 61 
27.4 -0.39 42.0 77 
32.8 -0.47 50.2 92 
38.2 -0.55 58.4 107 
43.6 -0.62 66.6 122 
48.9 -0.70 74.7 136 
54.2 -0.78 82.8 151 
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the 
growth of AV, is estimated to be equal to about $182,500. 
Table 15: General Increase in Permanent Special District Tax Levy in FY 2020/21 
Tax Increase 




revenue to other 
agencies 
($ million) 
Tax Bill Increase 




Tax Bill Increase 
($) 
0.10 6.2 -0.72 8.5 15 
0.20 12.4 -1.47 16.9 31 
0.30 18.5 -2.23 25.3 46 
0.40 24.7 -3.00 33.7 61 
0.50 30.8 -3.79 42.0 77 
0.60 37.0 -4.60 50.2 92 
0.70 43.1 -5.42 58.4 107 
0.80 49.2 -6.25 66.6 122 
0.90 55.3 -7.10 74.7 136 
1.00 61.3 -7.96 82.8 151 
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the 







Table 16: General Increase in Bond Obligation in FY 2020/21 
Tax Increase 








Tax Bill Increase 




Tax Bill Increase 
($) 
0.10 6.4 - 10.0 18 
0.20 12.9 - 20.0 37 
0.30 19.3 - 30.0 55 
0.40 25.8 - 40.0 73 
0.50 32.2 - 50.0 91 
0.60 38.7 - 60.0 110 
0.70 45.1 - 70.0 128 
0.80 51.6 - 80.0 146 
0.90 58.0 - 90.0 164 
1.00 64.5 - 100.0 183 
Note: The median AV of single-family properties amounts to $165,000 in 2017, and after adjusted to the 
growth of AV, is estimated to be equal to about $182,500. 
 
 
 
 
